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ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
IN FRAUD ACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT*
TE Securities Act of 1933 1 was designed to protect purchasers of securi-
ties.2 Its immediate aim was to coerce issuers, underwriters, and dealers to
disclose fully and fairly all material facts affecting the value of securities.0
The Act created special remedies in order to facilitate recovery of losses by
defrauded investors.4 Liability follows from the misrepresentation itself; the
Securities Act, unlike the common law fraud action, requires neither that
*Vilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WN'VE 3301
(U.S. June 1, 1953).
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1946). See, generally, Loss, Swculu-rs
REGULATION (1951) (hereinafter cited as Loss); Symposia, 43 YALE LJ. 171-2s0 (1933),
4 LAw & Cox mm. PRoB. 1-270 (1937).
2. SE-. RE. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). See Oklahoma-Te:as Trust v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F.2d M, 891 (10th Cir. 1939).
3. The Preamble states the Act's purpose as follows: "To provide full and fair dis-
closure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent fraud in the sale thereof... " 48 STAT. 74 (1933). See A. C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941).
The Act seeks to achieve this goal by three methods: (1) Issuers of most n:e-w seuri-
ties must file a registration statement with the SEC and supply purchasers with a pro-
spectus which, to meet SEC standards, must disclose all "material" facts. See Loss 120-
255; 10 SEC ANN. REP. 14-17 (1944) ; Byse & Bradley, Proposals to A:cnd the Regis-
trat on and Prospecties Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 96 U. or PA. L, R v.
609 (1948). (2) Those who sell non-exempt securities in interstate commerce or by
mail without complying with the registration and prospectus requirements, and those
who sell any security in interstate commerce or by mail and misrepresent any "material"
fact, are subject to criminal prosecution. See Loss 1169-74. (3) Civil liability is im-
posed for violation of the Act. See note 4 infra.
4. Sellers of securities are liable for purchasers' losses if a misrepresentation .,as
made in the sale, regardless of exemption from the registration and prospectus require-
ments. § 12(2), 48 STAT. S4 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1946), Cady v. Murphy, 113
F.2d 983 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). See Loss 996-1011. And a de-
frauded investor may sue virtually everyone connected with the preparation of a false
registration statement. § 11, 48 STAT. 82 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 907 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1946), Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. der fed, 302 U.S.
726 (1937). See Loss 1011-29. Absolute civil liability is imposed on those who sell non-
exempt securities when the registration and prospectus requirements have not been met.
§ 12(1), 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §771(1) (1946). See Loss 990-6. See also,
generally, Shulman, Cil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YA.t L.J. 227 (1933).
For an analysis of the civil liability cases up to 1940, see Comment, 50 YALE UJ. 90
(1940). The cases up to 1951 are collected in Loss 935 n.16S and discussed id. at 9,3-9.
The industry's persistent attempts to have the civil liability provisions watered down
indicate the Act's in terrorem effect. See Comment, 50 YALE: .J. 90, 91, 102-106 (1940).
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the misrepresentation be the factor which induces a purchaser to buy, nor
that the misrepresented fact cause his lossY And the seller bears the burden
of proving his exercise of due care and lack of knowledge of the falsity of
the representation.6 In addition, the Act specifically preserves existing
remedies at law and in equity, arming the investor with an arsenal of re-
covery weapons.7 The prospect of easy recovery under the Securities Act
and the availability of non-federal remedies serve to encourage investors to
5. § 12(2), 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1946). See Murphy v, Cady, 30
F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S,
705 (1940). See Loss 999, 1018-9; Shulman,.supra note 4, at 243-5, 247-8. Under § 11
as amended, however, a defendant can reduce his liability to the extent that he proves
that the plaintiff's loss stemmed from some cause other than the misrepresented fact.
§11 (e) (3), 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §77k(e) (3) (1946).
In a common-law fraud action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the falseness of the de-
fendant's misrepresentation, which generally must be one of fact; (2) scienter, i.e,, the
defendant's knowledge or belief of its falseness; (3) the defendant's intention to Induce
the plaintiff to rely on the misrepresentation; (4) reasonable reliance by the plaintiff
(the fact misrepresented must be "material") ; (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from
such reliance. Loss 812-23; PROSsER, TORTS §§ 86-9 (1941); Harper & McNeely, A Syn-
thesis of the Law of Misrepresentation, 22 MXNN. L. REv. 939 (1938).
6. § 12(2), 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1946). "Unless responsibility
is to involve merely paper liability it is necessary to throw the burden of disproving
responsibility for reprehensible acts of omission or commission on those who purport to
issue statements for the public's reliance." H.R. RE. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1933).
7. § 16, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1946). See Loss 103-105. Besides an
action for fraud, see note 5 .rnpra, several other remedies are available at common law.
A purchaser may sue for negligent misrepresentation, which is subject to the limitations
of the doctrine of proximate cause. An action for breach of warranty will lie but geneial-
ly fails because it is usually held that there is no warranty as to the quality or value of
securities. A suit for rescission demands that the plaintiff show only a "material"
misrepresentation and reliance, but requires tender of the consideration received by
the plaintiff and is subject to the defense of laches, waiver, and ratification, See, general-
ly, Loss 956-62; PRossER, TORTS § 85 (1941). State "blue sky" laws also provide limited
bases for suits by defrauded investors. See EDELMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION IN TIE
48 STATEs 39 (1942) ; Loss 962-82.
These remedies are preserved, among other reasons, in order to cover those mis-
representations which the Securities Act cannot reach. For the federal statute to apply,
at least some part of the transaction must involve interstate commerce or the mails. The
circuits have split as to whether the misrepresentation itself must also have been trans-
mitted through interstate channels or the mails. Compare Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F.2d
44 (7th Cir. 1949) (misrepresentation itself), with Schnillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke &
Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943) (any part of transaction). The short statutes of limita-
tions on the Act's civil liability provisions bar some suits. See Rosenberg v. Hauo, 121
F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939) ; Loss
1001, 1029-32. This may account in part for the small amount of litigation under the
federal statute. Id. at 989. Moreover, the investor may find a more advantageous mea-
sure of damages elsewhere. The Act's standards do not allow the more substantial "loss
of bargain," accorded by some states in fraud actions. See McCoRxiCX, DAMAGES §§ 121-
122a (1935). Nor does the Act permit punitive damages. See id. § 77-85.
EVol. 62
NOTES
sue their defrauders. Moreover, the Act's special remedies are enforceable
in a wide choice of courts," making suit more convenient for plaintiffs and
defense potentially burdensome." Finally, sellers cannot avoid the cumulative
impact of these provisions by contract, for the Act declares void a purchaser's
waiver of his statutory rights.10
Securities dealers, however, frequently contract with customers to settle
disputes by arbitration 1L-a method which has been encouraged generally, but
one outside the court remedies provided by the Securities Act. Insofar as
it is speedy and economical, arbitration appears to be in harmony with the
Act's aim of facilitating recovery of losses by defrauded investors. The
Federal Arbitration Act indicates congressional approval of agreements to
use this alternative to litigation.1 2 This Act permits court enforcement of
8. §22(a), 48 STAT. 86 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 1921 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §77v
(a) (1946). An action brought in a state court may not be removed by the defendant
into a federal court. Ibid. If the plaintiff chooses the federal courts, he has a wide choice
of venue, nation-wide service of process, and need not meet the usual $3MUU jurisdictinal
amount. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 2D (1940). See
Loss 1175-9.
9. See second paragraph of note 85 infra, and text at note S8 infra.
10. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any svcuri-
ty to xwaive compliance with any provision of this title . . . shall be void." § 14, 48 STAT.
84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1946).
11. Out of a sample of some twenty margin agreements in use, more than half con-
tained an arbitration clause. Communication to the Y.LE L.w Jourm;AL from Leunard
P. oore, Esq., dated 'March 12, 1953, in Yale Law Library. Arbitration has a lung
history of use in the securities market. See Jacquin, Arbitration in Acliton on 1 1'all SIrcet,
1 Ann. J. (x.s.) 261 (1946) ; Westwood & Howard, Self-Govcnwrnent i: the Sectriltes
Bsiness, 17 LAw & CoxrnmP. PROB. 518 (1952).
12. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946), codified, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
(Supp. 1952), Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932). The Act mahes arbi-
tration clauses in contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce or maritime transactions
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1952). On the Federal Act
generally, see A.B.A., Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United
States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153 (1925) ; Cohen & Dayton,
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265 (1926); Sturges & Murphy,
Some Confiusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United Slates Arbitration
Act, 17 LAw & Coxmnp. PROB. 580 (1952).
Compilations of state arbitration statutes are found in KU.,O., ,nTI&T9lo, o : Acro:.
221-346 (1941) ; STrJRGEs, Co N:mcLkL ARBiTRATioNs Am Aw,As (1930) (hereinafter
cited as STmrGEs).
Arbitration is regarded as "remedial" and not as a matter of substantive law; hence
the Federal Act governs only where federal jurisdiction can be and is invoked. Amal-
gamated Ass'n v. Southern Bus Lines, 189 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1951). The federal courts
still apply common-law rules to those agreements falling outside the Act, regardless of
state law. E.g., Tejas Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
See, generally, Stem, The Conflict of Laws in Comnwrcial Arbitration, 17 Lw," & C!.;-
nTp. P:oB. 567 (1952).
Where neither the federal nor a state arbitration act can be appued, courts generally
refuse to enforce contract provisions to arbitrate future disputes on the ground that they
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arbitration clauses in contracts 13 and provides for entry of judgnment upon
awards.14 So that delay and expense may be minimized, judicial action is
by motion proceedings.' 5 In order to accord finality to awards, they are not
reviewable on the merits but only on matters which go to the fairness of the
proceeding and to the form of the award.' 6 The Arbitration Act does not
violate public policy by "ousting the courts of jurisdiction." See United States Asphalt
Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). But see,
e.g., Rueda v. Union Pac. R.R., 180 Ore. 133, 175 P.2d 778 (1946). In the absence of
fraud or bias, no statute is necessary to provide court enforcement of an award once it
has been rendered. When, during litigation, an arbitration contract is entered with court
approval, or when an agreement requires an appraisal as a condition precedent to litiga-
tion but leaves the ultimate determination of liability to the courts, the contract will be
enforced. For general discussion, see Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109
(1924) ; Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942) ;
COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918); STuRGES §§ 7-25; Sayre,
DevelopMwnt of Comercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
13. See first paragraph of note 12 smpra. The Act provides for the stay of suits in
federal courts pending arbitration, for orders to compel arbitration, and for court appoint-
ment of arbitrators or an umpire. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-5 (Supp. 1952). See Sturges & Murphy,
Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration
Act, 17 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 580 (1952).
However, a court will deny enforcement on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. 1952), International Refugee Org.
v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 862 (4th Cir. 1951). Moreover, courts will not
coerce arbitration when the matter in dispute falls outside the arbitration clause, e.g.,
Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 58 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Tex. 1943),
aff'd, 146 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945) ; when the moving
party has no standing to enforce the arbitration clause, Transcontinental & Western Air
v. Parker, 144 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944) ; when the moving party has by his actions waived
his right to demand arbitration, e.g., American Locomotive Co. v. Gyro Process Co., 185
F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1950) ; when arbitration would interfere with a special court proceed-
ing, The Quarrington Court, 102 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub notmn Court Line,
Ltd. v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 307 U.S. 645 (1939); when the principal contract has been
repudiated, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha v. Nicolaou, 38 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. La. 1941) semble.
14. judgment may be entered on an award when the parties so provide i their agree-
ment. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. 1952). See Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Engineering
Co., 59 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1932). But ef. Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co.,
146 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1944).
15. 9 U.S.C. § 6 (Supp. 1952). See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924);
A.B.A., Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbi-
tration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1925); Cohen & Dayton, The
New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 271-4 (1926).
16. Vacation is permitted for fraudulently obtained awards, biased arbitrators, and
misconducted hearings. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. 1952), Hyman v. Pottberg's Ex'rs, 101
F.2d 262 (2d. Cir. 1939) (bias) ; Seldner Corp. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 22 F. Supp. 388
(D. Md. 1938) (no notice of hearing). A court may modify an award to correct errors
in mathematics, description, scope, and form which do not affect the merits. 9 U.S,C,
§ 11 (Supp. 1952). Cf. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E.
386 (1929), (scope; comparable provision of New York Act).
These are the only grounds on which awards may normally be upset under the Federal
Act. See, e.g., James Richardson & Sons v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55,
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permit vacation of awards merely because arbitrators fail to apply statu-
tory standards such as the special fraud liability provisions of the Securi-
ties Act.' 7 Should the parties stipulate that a particular standard shall govern,
a court will upset an othenvise unimpeachable award only if it finds that the
arbitrators completely disregarded, or committed a "gross mistake" in apply-
ing, that standard. 8 And no court will vacate an award on the ground that
57 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied. 305 U.S. 657 (1939) (reversing modification of award):
"The arbitrators, for reasons deemed sufficient to them, made the awards as indicated.
This court is without power to amend or overrule merely because of disagreement with
matters of law or facts determined by the arbitrators.... Their award is final and bind-
ing.... There is no claim here of fraud, corruption or misconduct affecting the award."
See also The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied sub now. Munson S.S.
Line v. North of England S.S. Co., Ltd., 288 U.S. 601 (1933); Baum & Pressman, The
Enforcement of Comnxrcial Arbitration Agrcenwnts in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U.LQ.
REv. 428, 438 (1931); Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statte, 36 YALE LJ. 607,
669 (1927). The federal and most state courts applied the same rules at commun law and
refused to examine awards on the merits. See STurGEs §§ 235, 366; Note, 63 HAr'. L
REV. 681 (1950). Thus Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344 (U.S. 1855), remains the lead-
ing federal case on the finality of awards.
The federal courts have shown reluctance to vacate awards even on the statutory
grounds. See, e.g., Karppingen v. Karl Kiefer Machine Co., 187 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1951)
(perjured testimony alleged) ; W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. James Richardson & Sons,
26 F. Supp. 11 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (complainant held estopped to raise issue of bias because
arbitration board named in contract and its decisions previously accepted witlout ob-
jection). See also Modern Brokerage Corp. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 56
F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
17. See note 16 sutra. However, the courts' refusal to examine how arbitrat.rs
reach their decisions does not mean that an award will be allowed Vs stand when it
sanctions a clearcut violation of a statute. See Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F24 )70.
974 (3d Cir. 1948). Nor will the arbitration process or arbitration agreements be per-
mitted to become vehicles for the achievement of illegal purposes. Paramount Famcius
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
18. Failure to apply standard: Campbell v. American Fabric Co., 168 F2d 959 (21
Cir. 1948). See United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d 746, 751 (4th
Cir. 1948). See STRGEs 793-6; Notes, 63 Htmv. L. Rrv. 631, 688-9 (1950), 26 VA. L
REV. 327, 346 (1940).
"Gross mistake": Oregon-Vashington R. & Nay. Co. v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 83
Ore. 528, 163 Pac. 600, 989 (1917). The theory is that the arbitrators did not really in-
tend the result because they misunderstood the standard and would have made a different
award had they understood it. See Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 351 (U.S. 1055).
See S=-t u s § 366. "While the foregoing principle concerning mistake of law may be
considered as elementary and generally accepted, . ..it has rarely been made effective
to set aside any award... :' Id. at 794. A "gross mistake" may be considered evidence
of fraud in obtaining the award or bias on the part of the arbitrators. See Hyan v.
Pottberg's Ex.rs, 101 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Boomer Coal & Coke Co. v. Osenton,
101 V. XTa. 683, 694, 133 S.E. 381, 385 (1926). See STuRGEs §363.
Courts have generally been reluctant to hold that the parties intended legal standards
to be applied, even when a submission so provides. E.g., White Star Mining Co. v. Hult-
berg, 220 Ill. 578, 77 N.E. 327 (1906). See STaMGEs 794; Phillips, Rules of Law or
Laisse."-Faire in Conmercial Arbitration, 47 Htmv. L. REv. 590, 603-4 (1934).
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in applying the stipulated standard it would have reached a different result
on the merits.19 Arbitration of statutory causes of action is, of course, per-
mitted. 20 But where the statutory cause of action forms an integral part of
a regulatory scheme, arbitration's freedom from legal rules and statutory
standards might prohibit its use. But so far the question has arisen only
where the liability was absolute and the solution of the issues left for arbi-
tration relatively mechanical.
21
In Wilko v. Swan, 22 an arbitration agreement was challenged as a waiver
of the remedial sections of the Securities Act.2 3 Opening an account with
defendant brokerage firm, plaintiff investor had signed a printed margin
agreement which provided, among other things, for arbitration of any dis-
pute arising under the contract.24 Thereafter, plaintiff started a fraud action
19. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948).
Those who resort to arbitration "must content themselves with looser approximations
to the enforcement of their rights than those that the law accords them. . . " American
Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944).
See also Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344 (U.S. 1855); James Richardson & Sons v,
W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 657
(1939) ; STURGES 793-6.
20. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
777 (1946) (action for overtime wages under Fair Labor Standards Act) ; Donahue v.
Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (same). See also Agostini Bros.
Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944).
21. See Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970, 973 (3d Cir. 1948) Watkins v.
Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 320 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946);
Jones v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 98 F. Supp. 787, 788-9 (W.D. Pa. 1951),
vacated on other grounds, 107 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
22. 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
23. The Wilko case appears to be one of first impression. No reported case con-
strues the Securities Act non-waiver clause; one makes passing mention of that pro-
vision. Kaiser-Frazer Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F.2d 838, 843 m.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 856 (1952). See Loss 1076. And no reported case deals with an attempt to
compel arbitration of a Securities. Act cause of action.
Moreover, there appear to have been virtually no settlements by arbitration of these
claims. Communications to the YALE LANv JOURNAL from Martin Domke, Director of
Legal Research, American Arbitration Ass'n, dated April 2, 1953, from John T. Gwynne,
Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, dated March 27, 1953, in
Yale Law Library (no known cases).
Court enforcement of arbitration contracts in the securities field seems to have been
confined to disputes outside the coverage of the Securities Act. Parry v. Bache, 125
F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1942). See also Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N.Y. 213, 177 N.E. 424
(1931). The federal district courts have occasionally stayed actions in which the plain-
tiff alleged injury resulting from the defendant's violation of margin regulations issued
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. O'Connell v. Mallory, 7 CCH Fit. Ste.
LAw RP. ff90,445 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Appel v. Levine, Civil No. 46-662, S.D.N.Y., Sept.
20, 1948. But such actions are grounded on general tort theory concerning injuries stem-
ming from illegal conduct rather than on any special civil liability created by that statute.
See Loss 1043-7.
24. The form contract included 17 paragraphs of fine print on one sheet of 8y x 11
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under the Securities Act 25 for losses incurred on certain stock purchased
from defendant, alleging that defendant had misrepresented the affairs of the
issuing corporation.2 6 Defendant invoked the Federal Arbitration Act and
moved to stay the suit pending arbitration.2 7 The district judge denied the
motion, stressing that the Securities Act provided remedies enforceable in
court. 2s He held that the agreement to arbitrate violated the Securities Act
non-waiver clause because it "require [d] the purchaser to sign away his rights
to a court remedy ... as a preliminary to the purchase of stock." - More-
over, the judge apparently considered the nature of arbitration to be such that
Securities Act fraud claims should never be arbitrated. He noted that Con-
gress "expressly found" the shift of part of the burden of proof to the seller
"vital to the legislation and the remedy." 30 And "[i] n view of the informality
of the arbitration proceeding and the restricted court review," he could see
"no certainty" that this advantage "would be wholly protected .... "31 Thus
the district court apparently thought that any contract to arbitrate and the
arbitration process itself were incompatible with the purposes of the Securities
Act.
3 2
The Second Circuit, two to one, reversed the lower court and held that
the Securities Act non-waiver clause did not preclude enforcement of an arbi-
inch paper. A copy is on file in the Yale Law Library. The text is set out in Transcript
of Record, pp. 11-16, Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
Neither the district court nor the court of appeals in Wilho appears to have considered
the possibility that a claim for fraud under the Securities Act might not be a dispute
arising under the contract. The arbitration clause is not literally the "all future disputes"
type but covers "[a]ny controversy arising between us under this contract" (id. at 16),
which purports to cover "all... relations and dealings" between the parties (id. at 11).
Hence, it might have been argued that fraud vas not contemplated. If the court had so
found, it could not have stayed the litigation. Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, 58 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Tex. 1943), aft'd, 146 F2d 62 (5th Cir. 1944), cert.
demied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945).
25. §12(2), 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §771(2) (1946).
26. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
27. See first paragraph of note 13 supra.
28. Wilko v. Svran, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
29. Id. at 78.
The district judge also adopted the SEC's suggestion that "many purchasers of securi-
ties would not hesitate to sign the printed form in small type which includes a provision
for arbitration... , particularly as few purchasers are aware of the provisions of the
Securities Act" Id. at 77.
30. Id. at 78.
31. Id. at 79.
32. For a variety of reasons, several cases have held certain types of disputes in-
appropriate for arbitration. See, e.g., Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D.
Del. 1930) (validity and infringement of patent, alternative holding) ; Wise v. Johnson,
14 Ala. App. 396, 69 So. 986 (1915) (criminal prosecutions); Kingwood Management
Corp. v. Salzman, 272 App. Div. 328, 70 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1st Dep't 1947) (attorney's fee
in treble damage action under Federal Emergency Price Control Act; statute provided
that court should set fee); Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (custody of children).
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tration agreement in a fraud action under the Act. 8 Judge Swan, for the
majority, interpreted a statement in the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's amicus brief for plaintiff as admitting that a contract to arbitrate an
existing claim would be valid.84 And if this were so, the majority could
"conceive of no sound reason why they may not agree in advance. .. ."
The court pointed out that the judicial remedy provided by the Act is merely
permissive: to declare that a defrauded investor "may sue" does not mean
that he is "obligated to sue."'a0 The court felt that "settlement by arbitra-
tion" was no more a waiver than voluntary settlement, which was clearly
permissible under the Act. 7 Therefore, the court concluded, "[a] stipula-
tion to arbitrate cannot be [voided as] a 'provision binding any person . . .
to waive compliance with [the Act].' "8 Nor did the majority think that
the plaintiff would lose his burden of proof advantage by arbitrating.80 Be-
cause the transaction involved was "subject to" the Securities Act, the court
reasoned, "the arbitrators are bound to decide in accordance with" the Act's
standard of liability.40 "Failure to do so," the majority indicated, "would
.. . constitute grounds for vacating the award. . .. ,,41 By contrast, Judge
Clark in his dissent feared that arbitrators, though attempting to follow the
Securities Act standard, might misapply the burden of proof and deny re-
33. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
34. See id. at 443. "This case does not involve the question, which appellants attempt
to present, whether all agreements to arbitrate disputes between customers and brokers,
including agreements pertaining only to commercial or technical disputes, or possibly all
agreement for -arbitration of a cause of action under Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act entered
into after the cause of action has been asserted, are invalid or unenforceable. We express
no opinion on the enforceability of an arbitration contract entered into after a Section
12(2) cause of action has been asserted." Amicus Brief for SEC, p. 11, Wilko v. Swan,
201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
35. Id. at 443. Cf. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1949)
(concurring opinion).
36. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953).
37. Ibid. The majority seems to have overlooked the fact that a settlement, by its
nature, can occur only after a claim has arisen.
The court also stated: "It is far from clear that the words 'waive compliance with'
refer to anything more than the mandatory or prohibitive provisions of the Act, The
means of enforcement provisions, on the other hand, seem clearly permissive, not re-
quiring compliance." Id. at 444 n.8. But see Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western RR., 338
U.S. 263, 266 (1949) (FELA non-waiver clause). Moreover, the Securities Act says
"any provision." § 14, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1946) (emphasis supplied).
38. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953).
39. The majority was not, however, without its doubts on this point. See id. at 441,
444,445.
40. Id. at 444-5.
41. Id. at 445. This statement appears to be erroneous. If the court meant that it
would vacate an award whenever the Securities Act standard was incorrectly applied, it
is changing the law of arbitration and undermining the arbitration process. See text at
notes 16-19 supra, and 80-2 infra.
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covery where courts would grant it.4 He pointed out that judicial review
of awards could not catch such errors without becoming overly cumbersome.,"
He suggested, however, that a distinction should be drawn bet-een an agree-
ment entered into before any claim arose and "an arbitration mutually
acceptable ...as a method of settlement of an already existing dispute."',
The provision in the Securities Act for court enforcement of its special
fraud liability should not be read to bar arbitration of securities fraud claims
under all circumstances. The district court apparently thought that the extra-
judicial nature of arbitration precluded its use."l5 But, as the court of appeals
pointed out, the statute merely permits a defrauded investor to sue.40 And
both settlement and arbitration are recognized as legitimate extra-judicial
means for disposing of claims.47 Since the Act must contemplate the possi-
bility of settlement,48 express statutory language would seem necessary to
exclude arbitration unless some other reason can be found.4 9 In arbitration,
unlike settlement, a claimant is bound by the decision of a third party ;c0 in
this respect arbitration is a remedy like suit, but not in court." But the
statutory language "may sue.. . in any court of competent jurisdiction. ... "- 2
serves merely to state where a plaintiff may pursue judicial remedies, not
to forbid quasi-suits outside the courts: the word "sue" does not mean any
submission of an issue to a third party,53 hence the phrase "in any court"
42. WVilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445-6 (2d Cir. 1953).
43. Id. at 446.
44. Ibid. Judge Clark's language does not make clear whether he would uphold any
arbitration contract made after an investor asserts a claim for fraud or only a formal
submission of a dispute to arbitration. However, he cites cases holding that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act non-waiver clause recognizes settlements but invalidates even
contracts made after an injury has occurred which restrict an employee's choice of forums.
Particularly in view of Judge Clark's opinion in one of the cases cited, Krenger v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 333 U.S. 866 (1949), it appears that
he would approve only submissions.
45. See text at notes 2Z-30 spra.
46. See text at note 36 szpra.
47. See Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625 (1948) (settlement): note 12
sutpra and accompanying text (arbitration).
48. Cf. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.P., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948) (FELA): "Mhere
controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much, Congress has
not said that parties may not settle their claims without litigation."
49. See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953): "The Arbitration Act
evidences a congressional policy to favor arbitration. ...If Congress had intended tw
forbid arbitration in a suit based on section 12(2) [of the Securities Act], we believe
it would have expressed such intent."
50. See text at notes 13, 14 supra.
51. "Arbitration is merely a form of trial, to be adopted... in place of a trial at
common law.. . " 'Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F2d 331, 3M (2d Cir.
1944).
52. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 48 STAr. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §771 (1946).
53. The word embraces only court proceedings. See Keller v. Industrial Commissign,
350 Ill. 390, 396, 183 N.E. 237, 240 (1932). See also Bouvmn, Lw DIzo:NA=v (Bald-
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cannot be construed to limit such proceedings to court. The feature of arbi-
tration which disturbed the district court is that it provides only "approxi-
mations" of legal rights. 4 But this fact in itself does not seem significant.
The Act expressly leaves investors free to pursue existing remedies, such
as a common law fraud action, whose standards of liability likewise only
"approximate" those of the Act and bar recovery in many cases where the
Act would allow it.15  Thus neither the "approximations" nor the quasi-
suit nature of arbitration afford sound bases for prohibiting its use to decide
securities fraud claims.
Voluntary submission of an existing claim to arbitration would not appear
to be a "waiver" within the meaning of the Securities Act non-waiver clause.60
True, in applying a similar non-waiver provision, 7 the Supreme Court has
invalidated contracts made after an injury occurs which restrict a plaintiff's
statutory right to sue.08 And, at first glance, a submission would appear to
fall within this prohibition. 9 Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, the
Court will allow a plaintiff to bind himself to a particular recovery method
without taking his cause to judgment; a full settlement, fairly arrived at, is
a valid contract which will bar suit.00 Of course, a claimant who settles in-
stead of litigating or arbitrating at least knows what he is getting.01 But,
although lie may not know the extent of recovery, a claimant who submits
a dispute to arbitration knows in considerable detail just what he is entrust-
ing to whom.02 Hence, if a settlement is permitted because the consequences
win's stud. ed. 1946) 1146; 40 WoRDs AND PHRASES 591 (perm. ed. 1940), 112 (Supp.
1953).
54. See text at note 31 siPra.
55. Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1946). See
notes 5, 7 supra for descriptions of these additional remedies.
56. See note 10 suepra.
57. Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 5, 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1946).
58. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (contract, made after
injury occurred, to sue only in certain forums held to violate FELA non-waiver clause).
Accord, Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
866 (1949) ; Akerly v. New York Cent. R.R., 168 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Petersen v.
Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P.2d 744 (1946). See also Duncan
v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1 (1942).
59. Since it is a contract, a submission precludes any exercise of the other available
remedies, except by mutual agreement. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp.
1952). See COHEN & DAYTON, HANDBOOK AND GUIDE TO CommmcIi ALin AT=o 71
(1932).
60. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625 (1948). See Boyd v. Grand Trunk
Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949).
61. Cf. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949).
62. See Note, Predictability of Result in Comenrcial Arbitration, 61 H/v. L. REV.
1022 (1948). At the time of submission, attention will be focused on crucial procedural
details which may not have been considered earlier, and decisions can be made with the
fullest possible knowledge of the facts. For example, the plaintiff can demand that a
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of the bargain are clear, a submission should not be barred as a waiver of
recovery rights. Nor should a submission be invalid as a waiver of the judi-
cial forums made available by the Act. A submission, like the filing of a
complaint, initiates proceedings to dispose of a particular claim. It would
seem that the mandate of the non-wmaiver clause is to leave open the defrauded
investor's choice of forums and recovery methods until he is ready to begin
proceedings.63 Until such time, he should be free to apprise himself of all
facts which might control his choice of relief. Binding election of a permis-
sible remedy, be it litigation, settlement, or arbitration, should be valid when
the action taken actually sets in motion the machinery which will decide the
dispute.64
Permitting the submission of existing claims to arbitration would seem to
further the Securities Act recovery policy. Arbitration provides an escape
from crowded court dockets, enabling a defrauded purchaser to present his
claim while the evidence is fresh and to obtain a judgment more quickly if
he wins. 5 Because it is generally more economical than litigation, the avail-
ability of arbitration might encourage the investor to pursue small claims
which, if litigated, would be consumed by legal fees, and doubtful claims where
the investor would be unwilling to risk the expense of a law suit.cO Moreover,
when a potential plaintiff decides to submit an existing claim to arbitration,
the "approximations" of the arbitration process constitute a calculated risk .rT
desired standard be applied and that the arbitrators be lawyers. Even without any stipu-
lation that rules of law shall govern, "lawyers. . . , by reason of their profession, will be
inclined to consider the application of legal principles." Communication to the YAm LAw
JoumN.A from Martin Domke, Director of Legal Research, American Arbitration Ass'n,
dated April 2, 1953, in Yale Law Library. However, in the case of an agreement prior
to submission, inclusion of such details may even be undesirable. See discussion in Con=
& DAYTONz, op. cit. supra note 59, at 9-15.
63. In applying the FELA non-waiver clause, the Second Circuit favorably c-n-
trasted a "valid compromise" with "a condition requiring fulfillment before an action
may be brought" or "a condition as to the place where action must be brought." Krenger
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 55S, 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. C6 (1949).
64. See note 48 supra. Procedurally, there are many similarities between a submissivn
to arbitration and the filing of a complaint. As to the initiation of proceedings aspect ojf
a submission, see Rules 7, 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbi-
tration Ass'n and sample forms in Corm & DAYToN, op. cit. spra note 59, at 71-3. As
to the binding nature of a complaint once an answer has been filed, see FE. R. Civ. P.
41(a) (1); 5 Mooma's FEDERAL PaAcricE Tt41.01-41.10 (2d ed. 1951). Cf. Ex tarte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (FELA).
65. See CoHr- & DAYkON, op. cit. supra note 59, at 5; Note, 61 H~uw. L REv. 1022
n.1 (1948). In a period of continuing inflation, a speedy recovery would be particularly
advantageous to the investor.
66. See CoHEN & DAY,,TO, op. cit. supra note 59, at 5; Note, 61 HRV. L RE' 102
n2 (1948). The high cost of litigation has been suggested as a significant factor in the
small number of actions under the Securities Act civil liability provisions. Loss 9S9.
67. The "approximations" may well operate in favor of the purchaser; several courts
have treated defrauded investors ungenerously in construing the Securities Act civil lia-
bility provisions. E.g., Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949) (no liability un-
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Presumably, he will submit a dispute to arbitration only when fully apprised
of his rights by counsel and only if he considers it the most advantageous
method for determining the particular claim. Furthermore, foreclosure of
other remedies at the time of submission will not reduce the Act's effective-
ness in coercing full and fair disclosure of the true nature of securities; the
full battery of remedies and forums available to defrauded investors 18 remains
focused on the seller at the time of temptation to misrepresent.
However, any arbitration agreement prior to submission should be void as
a waiver of statutory recovery rights. While the Securities Act offers de-
frauded investors many roads to recovery, 69 all save one are prematurely
blocked by an enforceable arbitration agreement made prior to submission.
The securities purchaser, denied the privilege of deferring his choice of
remedies until all facts affecting his claim are known,70 would be compelled
to forego his Securities Act and non-federal remedies and accept the risk
that the "approximations" of the arbitration process will operate to his
disadvantage. 1 Since the New York Stock Exchange and most others re-
quire members to arbitrate upon request of non-members, 2 a defrauded in-
vestor will, in most cases, need no advance contract to force a broker to
arbitrate a particular claim. Hence, an agreement prior to submission can
usually operate only to the seller's advantage. And a contract made before
any claim arises is further objectionable: such an agreement precludes the
investor, at the outset of the investor-broker relationship, from ever pursuing
the Securities Act's special court remedies against his promisee7
8 Such
abolitions of the freedom to select those remedies mark any arbitration agree-
ment other than a submission as "a device which obstructs the right of the
... plaintiff to secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial
less misrepresentation itself made in interstate commerce or transmitted by mail) ; Shonts
v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (because stockholder has access to cor-
porate books, purchaser of stock held to have constructive notice of untruth of misrepre-
sentation).
68. See notes 4, 5, 7 supra.
69. See notes 4, 5, 7 supra and accompanying text.
70. Not only might additional facts turn up between the time of an arbitration agree-
ment and submission or the institution of a law suit, but the factors affecting the claim-
ant's choice of remedy and forum are also subject to change. The spate of litigation
growing out of post-injury contracts limiting FELA plaintiffs' choice of judicial forums,
note 58 supra, indicates as much. See also note 62 supra.
71. See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
72. Jacquin, Arbitration in Action in Wall Street, 1 ARB. J. (N.s.) 261, 263-4 (1946).
Although the Wilko case appears to be the first attempt at arbitration of a Securities Act
fraud claim, arbitration has been used to settle virtually every other type of controversy
between brokers and their customers. For examples, see id. at 263. See also note 23
supra.
73. Cf. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912)
(advance stipulations equivalent to release held void under FELA). See also Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (waiver of liquidated damages under Fair
Labor Standards Act held void).
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of his cause."74 Only an assurance that arbitrators will grant recovery where-
ever the most sympathetic court would do so in applying the Act's special
remedies could prevent arbitration contracts in advance of submission from
operating as waivers of the purchaser's statutory right to damages for fraud.
And that assurance is not available.
Judicial review of awards could not guarantee exact imposition of the
statutory liability without undermining the arbitration process. It would be
virtually impossible to prove in a reviewing court that the Securities Act
burden of proof standard had not been applied. Arbitrators seldom give
reasons for their awards 75 and will generally not be heard to impeach them76
There is usually no transcript of the proceedings,7 and he who would upset
an award bears the burden of proof.7 8 Moreover, since recovery under the
Securities Act will in many cases turn on the burden of proof, mistaken
application of the Act's standard, as well as no application at all, can result
in denial of recovery.79 And since arbitrators are not generally ex-pected to
be legal experts, mistakes of law may occur.80 In either case, a guarantee
of recovery wherever the most sympathetic court would grant it would prob-
ably require the equivalent of a trial de novo to determine what conclusion
the arbitrators should have reached. And mistakes of law or fact would call
for vacation of awards. But the law at present permits neither: it recognizes
74. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 33S U.S. 263. 265 (1949).
75. The American Arbitration Ass'n discourages the writing nf 6pinions Ity arhi-
trators. See KELuoa, ARBrrApToz mr Acrioz 115-6 (1941); Fraenkel, Procedral As-
pects of Arbitration, 83 U. o,- PA_ L. REv. 226, 240 (1934). See Wilko Y. Swan, 201 F.2d
439, 446 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion). See also CoHEn & DAo:M, HA:;rzo::
A-D GUIDE TO Com CIcAIL APPRim-TIO 35-6 (1932).
76. E.g., Bisnovich v. British America Assurance Co., 100 Conn. 240, 123 Atl. 339
(1924). See ST-RGES §365.
77. CoaN- & DAoxro, op. cit. supra note 75, at 23; Kyu.on, op. cit. supra note 75,
at 87-8, 108.
78. See cases cited in last paragraph of note 16 stipra; STUrnGsS § 364.
79. Cf. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (FELk
case where state judge applied local instead of federal law to determine whether release
obtained by fraud). Assuming that the arbitrators do attempt to follow the Securities
Act burden of proof standard, they may believe that a defendant has met the burden of
proof when a court would not so find. In such a case, an investor would nut rccover in
arbitration although he would in court. See, generally, Note, Prcdictabilfly of Reelt in
Commwrcial Arbitration, 61 HAnv. L. Rv. 1022 (1948).
80. See American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F2d
448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944). See ConEx & D.-YTo., op. cit. supra note 75, at 3-4; KEIax.oT,
op. cit. s=pra note 75, at 106-07 (1941); Baum & Pressman, The Esforcceuct of Com-
snercial Arbitration Agreements in the Fedcral Courts, 8 N.Y.U.LQ. RM. 428, 433
(1931); Simpson, Specific Enforccment of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. 0' PA. L Rcv.
160, 173-4 (1934). Neither the Federal Act, most state statutes, nor the common la,:
permit a court to advise arbitrators on matters of law,, even if the arbitrators desire
advice. For criticism and a suggested alternative based on the English practice, tee
Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 Hnv. L. Rv.
590, 602-19 (1934).
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that arbitration is a desirable substitute for litigation only so long as it re-
mains economical and speedy."' And those advantages depend on the finality
accorded awards by the restriction of judicial review.82 Arbitration might or
might not favor a defrauded investor in a particular case, 3 but there can
be little control over deviations from the Securities Act standard as a court
would interpret it.
Viewed in light of Supreme Court precedent on a similar provision, the
Securities Act non-waiver clause demands that the plaintiff also be free to
choose the forum for the disposition of each claim. Counterparts of the non-
waiver provision and the wide choice of courts are found in the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.84 Both statutes not only give the plaintiff a choice
but make his'selection controlling-the defendant cannot remove an action
brought in a state court into federal court.8 5 And the Supreme Court has
81. See United Fuel Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp., 165 F.2d 746, 751 (4th Cir
1948); Boomer Coal & Coke Co. v. Osenton, 101 W. Va. 683, 694, 133 S.E. 381, 385
(1926). See KEI.LOR, op. cit. supra note 75, at 4 (1941).
82. "If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest decision of the
arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity, will not set it
aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substitution of the
judgment bf the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make
an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation." Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How.
344, 349 (U.S. 1855). See Baum & Pressman, The Enforcement of Comnmercial Arlilra-
tion Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 428, 438 (1931); Note, 26
VA. L. Ray. 327, 345 (1940).
83. See Note, Predictability of Result in Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARv. L. Rav.
1022 (1948).
84. The FELA non-waiver clause states: "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to
exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void .... I
§ 5, 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1946). Federal and state courts are given con-
current jurisdiction. § 6, 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1946). For
the Securities Act provisions, see notes 8, 10 supra.
By contrast, the statutes involved in those federal cases which have upheld arbitration
of a statutory cause of action, notes 20-21 supra, contain no non-waiver clauses.
85. Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 48 STAT. 86 (1933), as amended, 49 STAT. 1921
(1936), 15 U.S.C. §77v(a) (1946); FELA §6, 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45
U.S.C. §56 (1946). See Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 703 (1942). See
Loss 1175-9.
As stated bluntly by Mr. Justice Jackson with regard to the FELA venue provision,
Congress "load[ed] the dice a little in favor of the workman in the matter of venue."
"[A) plaintiff ... may go shopping for a judge or a jury believed to be more favorable
than he would find in his home forum." Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., sispra at 706-07
(concurring opinion). See also Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 558-9 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949) ; Petersen v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 110
Utah 573, 576-9, 175 P.2d 744, 746-7 (1946).
It had also been held that a defendant in federal court could neither enjoin an action
nor obtain a transfer of venue on grounds of inconvenient forum. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (FELA, attempt to enjoin); Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Wimer, 75 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Pa. 1948) (Securities Act, motion for
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held that the FELA non-waiver clause invalidates contracts which preclude
an injured railroad employee from suing "in any eligible forum," even when
the contract is made after an injury occurs.8 0 It would seem to follow that
an arbitration agreement which excludes a defrauded investor from all courts
given jurisdiction by the Securities Act would dearly violate that statute's
non-waiver clause. This would be particularly true of a contract like that in
W~ilko which prevents the investor from ever taking any claim into court s
Unlike the initiation of a lawsuit, settlement, or the actual submission of a
claim to arbitration-which are themselves final choices-an arbitration agree-
ment prior to submission abolishes the plaintiff's option of forums specifically
provided by the Act.
Enforcement of arbitration contracts made before any claim arises, like
that in WVilko, permits securities dealers to emasculate some of the Securities
Act's most effective deterrents to misrepresentation. The availability to plain-
tiffs of an arsenal of recovery weapons and a wide choice of forums leaves
the seller with little basis for calculating the probability that he may be held
liable, the extent of his liability, or the cost, time, and inconvenience involved
in defending the claim."s If an arbitration agreement made beforehand is en-
forceable, the seller knows that all claims will be disposed of quickly, economi-
cally, and conveniently."s The Securities Act non-waiver clause was aimed
at preventing just such contractual reductions of the Act's effectiveness.0°
transfer of venue). However, since the codification of the doctrine of fort: non con-
veniens by the 1948 revision of the judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1952), the
Supreme Court has held that transfer of venue is permissive in an FELA action brought
in federal court. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949). This result seems incong ous.
Two members of the Court espoused the view that the Code provision wmas not intended
to apply to actions arising under federal regulatory statutes. See United States v. Na-
tional City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 84 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Since § 1404(a) applies
only to actions in federal courts, FELA actions brought in state courts cannot be enjoined
on grounds of inconvenient forum. Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 73 Sup. Ct. 749
(1953).
86. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263, 265 (1949) (emphasis sup-
plied). See cases cited, note 58 supra. Cf. Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1 (1942)
(agreement making repayment of $600 advanced to injured employee condition precedent
to his bringing suit held void).
87. See note 73 supra.
88. See notes 4, 5, 7 supra.
89. Cf. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir.), ccrt. dc:icd, 338
U.S. 866 (1949); Petersen v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 110 Utah 573, 579, 175
P.2d 744, 747 (1946).
90. See text at note 10 supra.
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